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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Whether Environmental Friends, a worldwide environmental organization has standing to challenge the Department's cleanup project for the Venice, Italy, missile
site based on the Department's failure to comply with
procedural mandates of the National Environmental Policy Act?
(2) Whether the National Environmental Policy Act, which
mandates that federal agencies consider the environmental impacts of their major actions, applies to a project of
the Department of Defense in a foreign country, thereby
preventing significant and long-range environmental degradation as intended by the Act?
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OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia in Environmental Friends, Inc. v. Secretary, Department of Defense, No. 91-453 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September of 1990, the U.S. Army announced its intent to use Biocore, a genetically engineered microorganism,
to cleanup, the missile fuel contamination at a missile base located just outside of Venice, Italy. (R. 3-4). This substance
was developed and tested in the Army's laboratories and controlled greenhouse, but has yet to be used in any viable, natural ecosystem. (R.3) After limited testing, the Army asserts
that Biocore eats missile fuel, multiplying in the soil until its
sustenance is depleted. (R.3) The Army theorizes that at that
point the organisms will die for lack of nourishment and cease
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to further invade the environment. (R.3) However, none of
their hypotheses have been aired in the public forum and the
Army never provided developmental information or environmental documentation of its experiments until questioned
during congressional hearings. (R.3-4) To date there has been
no analysis of Biocore's potential effects on this particular
site. (R.3-4)
The Army intends to apply this organism to the missile
base as the test case for its program to cleanup contaminated
military bases located in foreign countries. (R.3) This particular base has been used exclusively by the United States Army
since the 1950s. (R.2) Originally housing a variety of live ordnance, since 1969 it has been used primarily for storage. (R.2)
Although the site may eventually be returned to the control of
the Italian government, there are no definite plans to that effect at this time. (R.2) The site is in close proximity to Venice,
a heavily populated, architecturally unique, and culturally
priceless city situated in a picturesque environment. (R.2-4)
Furthermore, the area surrounding Venice and the missile site
serves as an aesthetic and recreational resource for the inhabitants of the area, as well as numerous tourists from all over
the world. (R.4) The extensive floodplains in this area, many
associated with the Alpine tributaries leading to the Gulf of
Venice, give the city its particular flavor. This scenario creates
a particular problem with regard to the Army's use of Biocore.
(R.4) The missile fuel contaminant which sustains the organism washes with the soil in heavy rain, and presumably also
with flood water. This creates the potential for tremendous
damage to an immense area should Biocore's biological activity be uncontainable and extend beyond the boundaries of the
site itself. (R.3)
When the Army announced that it would be testing Biocore at the Venice, Italy, missile site, a document surfaced
which had been completed in March 1990, entitled "Summary
Environmental Analysis of the Venice, Italy, Missile Site
Clean-up." The twenty-page document is the only information
that has been provided for a project which proposes to introduce into the environment an untried, artificially engineered
microorganism. (R.4) The document devotes only six pages to

9
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the development and limited testing of Biocore, with no analysis of its potential impact in actual use at this particular site.
(R.3-4) The only other documentation produced by the army
is an environmental assessment and a "finding of no significant impact" completed on Biocore's laboratory development.
(R.4) Recognizing the potential for disaster and the imminent
threat to the environment, Environmental Friends filed suit to
ensure that the Department of Defense complies with its affirmative duty to complete an adequate environmental assessment as mandated by the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"). (R.4)
At trial, His Honor Judge Romulus N. Remus of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Environmental Friends, Inc. and Defense Contractors Association. The defendant, the Department of Defense ("DOD"), was ordered to
comply with the procedural mandates of NEPA before undertaking the cleanup project at the Venice, Italy, missile site.
(R.8) The DOD's motion for summary judgment was denied
and the plaintiffs were found to have standing to challenge
the Department's action. (R.5-6) In addition, the court found
that the procedural mandates of NEPA do apply extraterritorially to the DOD's project at the Venice, Italy, missile site.
(R.6-7) The defendant subsequently filed a notice of appeal to
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Twelfth
Circuit.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The lower court was correct in determining both that Environmental Friends has standing to bring this case and that
NEPA applies to the DOD action at the Venice, Italy, missile
site. These issues will be approached in that order. However,
before proceeding with the standing analysis, it is important
to point out the posture of that aspect of this case. The lower
court decision in favor of standing for Environmental Friends
was predicated on a motion for summary judgment by the
DOD. Therefore, Environmental Friends must aver specific
facts showing that each requirement of standing is fulfilled.
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This burden has been more than adequately met.
Standing to bring a case must first meet the constitutional requirements that a plaintiff suffer injury-in-fact, which
is fairly traceable to the defendant's action and redressable by
the relief requested. Additionally, the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") requires a suit challenging an agency decision to show that the injury caused thereby is the result of
final agency action and is within the meaning of the statute.
Environmental Friends has specifically fulfilled each criterion.
For an association to have standing to bring suit, it must
establish that individual members have standing to sue in
their own right, that the interests being protected are germane to the organization's purpose, and that individual participation by the members is not required. Since the substantive merits of this case go to the actions of the Army and not
any individual member, the latter will clearly have no individual contribution. In addition, the stated purpose of Environmental Friends to recognize and respect the complexities of
the environment goes to the heart of the interests at stake in
this case. Environmental Friends is requesting that the consequences be considered before a purely experimental, artificially engineered organism is released into the environment.
Environmental Friends has also established that some individual members have standing in their own right. In addition, the specific facts which have been averred are sufficient
to withstand summary judgment. The affiants herein have all
alleged threatened injury to their economic, recreational, and
aesthetic interests. These include potential loss of income as
well as loss of lifelong investment in a home. These are the
traditional, time-honored interests for standing. Moreover, the
recreational and aesthetic injuries that these affiants will inevitably suffer also support the organizations' standing to bring
this suit. The affiants have detailed the exact discrete locations where they live, work, and play, and wherein their injuries would occur.
Failure of the Army to comply with NEPA and consider
the complexities of the ecosystem in which Biocore will be released is the direct cause of the threatened injuries. If the
mandates of NEPA are fulfilled, the potential threat will be
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redressed by the assessment required thereunder. The Army's
failure to comply with NEPA is evidenced by not one, but
three, final agency actions which are each adequate to establish standing.
The Army's failure to do an EIS is a final agency action.
In addition, the "Summary Environmental Analysis of the
Venice, Italy, Missile Site Clean-up" ("Summary Analysis") is
a final action because it is the Army's final, definitive statement on the impacts of the project, not just a preliminary
step. Finally, the Army's announcement of its plan to use Biocore, in addition to allocating money and personnel for the
project, represents a firm commitment. Review at this time
would in no way disrupt any ongoing processes. Clearly, denial
of review would work considerable harm because the only step
left is implementation, after which it will be too late to avoid
the repercussions.
The injuries which Environmental Friends is seeking to
prevent are unarguably "within the meaning. of the statute."
This is the "zone of interest" requirement, and it is uncontestable that preventing environmental injury is within the
"zone of interest" of a statute whose very purpose is to prevent environmental degradation.
NEPA provides that federal agencies must consider the
environmental impacts of their major actions, notwithstanding the extraterritoriality of those impacts. Congress has the
inherent authority to do this because it can regulate the conduct of United States citizens outside of the national borders.
NEPA's worldwide scope is evidenced in its own language, the
history of the Act, and its subsequent interpretations, by the
agencies themselves and the other branches, including the
courts.
The language of NEPA interwoven throughout the Act
reflects Congressional intent for NEPA to apply extraterritorially. The Declaration of Purpose, the policy statements, and
the action-forcing provisions of NEPA all demonstrate Congressional intent to apply the statute in every location. The
total structure of the Act indicates that NEPA is to apply
outside the borders of the United States when there are countervailing policies implicated.
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The legislative history preceding the statute and providing the impetus for its passage reflects attention on the worldwide character of environmental needs. Congressional hearings after passage of NEPA further instruct on the application
of the law beyond the borders of the United States. Furthermore, subsequent related legislation, such as the Base Closure
Act, implicitly recognizes NEPA' extension to foreign locations. Indeed, recent proposals to centralize agency environmental functions specifically clarify the extraterritorial reach
of NEPA in order to eliminate confusion in that regard.
Beyond these clear indications from Congress itself, the
interpretations of other agencies and other branches, including the courts, have comported with the understanding that
NEPA's reach is extraterritorial. The agency charged with the
administration of NEPA, the Council on Environmental Quality, declares that NEPA applies outside the boundaries of the
United States. Numerous other agencies of the federal government have followed suit, despite DOD's steadfast refusal to
comply by promulgating the necessary regulation. The Executive Branch also recognizes that NEPA applies extraterritorially to the fullest extent possible where not in conflict with
countervailing diplomatic and security policies.
Finally, courts facing the issue of NEPA's extraterritorial
application have consistently recognized that the Act should
apply to actions outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States when the goals of NEPA are not countermanded by other national goals. Extraterritorial application
of NEPA is particularly strengthened where American citizens
could face environmental injuries in foreign jurisdictions.
For these reasons, as further elaborated below, this Court
should affirm the lower court's decision that Environmental
Friends does have standing to bring this cause and NEPA
does apply to the DOD's cleanup action at the Venice, Italy,
missile site.
ARGUMENT
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL FRIENDS HAS STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S
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CLEANUP PROJECT FOR THE VENICE, ITALY,
MISSILE SITE BASED ON THE DEPARTMENT'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURAL
MANDATES OF NEPA.
For purposes of establishing standing in a case predicated
upon the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
4321-370 (1988), a plaintiff must address two tiers of analysis.
First, the requirements of article III of the United States Constitution must be met. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Secondly, the
statutorily mandated requirements of section 702 of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988), must be
met. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177,
3185-86 (1990). These latter requirements apply because
NEPA has no separate procedural component and therefore
falls within the review provisions of the APA. Lujan, 110 S.
Ct. at 3185; Scherr v. Volpe, 336 F. Supp. 882, 884 (W.D.Ct.
Wis. 1971). It is clear from a review of these requirements,
and their application to the facts of the instant case, that Environmental Friends has fulfilled all the requisites for standing to challenge the Department of Defense plan for clean-up
at the Venice, Italy, missile site.
Although the elements of the constitutional and statutory
standing criteria can be separately articulated and listed, the
fact is that they are not altogether separate conceptually. The
constitutional standing criteria have been characterized by the
United States Supreme Court as the "irreducible minimum."
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Therefore, the statutory standing criteria are in some sense "in addition" to those required by the Constitution when the action
challenged is that of an administrative agency. However, some
aspects of the analysis are the same whether done under the
strictures of article III, or the mandates of the APA. Compare
Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 901 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (analyzing injury under
a constitutional standing analysis) with Lujan, 110 S. Ct. at
3187-89 (analyzing injury under an APA standing analysis).
Therefore, to the extent that the criteria overlap, they. will be

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss2/8

14

19921

BEST APPELLEE BRIEFS

discussed together, with digression as required where they
diverge.
Three elements must be fulfilled in order to establish
standing under article III: "(1) injury-in-fact, (2) [which is]
fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision." Foundation on Economic
Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Valley
Forge, 454 U.S. at 472). Furthermore, when judicial review is
sought under the APA, the plaintiff must meet the requirements of section 702 which mandates that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof." 5 U.S.C. § 702
(1988).
In the following discussion, the "person suffering legal
wrong, adverse affect or aggrievement" criteria will be incorporated with the discussion of the constitutional injury-in-fact
criteria. The "agency action" criteria, will be discussed in conjunction with the constitutional requirement that the injury
be" fairly traceable to the challenged action" and "redressable
by a favorable decision." Finally, "injury within the meaning
of the statute," the so-called "zone of interest" test, will be
addressed separately. Environmental Friends has alleged facts
which fulfill each of the constitutional and statutory requirements for standing. In addition, the plaintiff's averments are
the specific facts required to withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
A.

Environmental Friends has established standing to
bring suit on behalf of its members for threatened,
imminent injuries to their interests occasioned by
the Army's failure to comply with NEPA.
1. Environmental Friends can bring suit on behalf
of its members because some individual members
have standing to sue in their own right, their individual participation is not required, and the organization's purpose is germane to the interests it

15
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is seeking to protect.
Under the first element of constitutional standing, an alleged injury must have been, or will be, personally suffered by
some individual. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. This latter requirement raises the issue of "associational" standing by
which an organization stands in the place of its members and
brings suit on their behalf. An organization can bring such a
challenge if "(a) its members would have standing to sue in
their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organizations purpose; and (c) neither the claim
asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit." Hunt v. Washington
State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977).
Approaching these factors in reverse order, neither Environmental Friends' claim that the Army must comply with
NEPA nor the requested relief-that they do so, requires the
individual participation of any members in the lawsuit. There
is no need in this case for individualized proof. See Hunt, 432
U.S. at 344. Nor is there any need for individual member contribution or individual assessment. See Center for Auto
Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d
1322, 1329 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The determination of
whether the Army has adequately considered the environmental consequences of its remedial project is dependant upon the
Army's actions and choices. The members of Environmental
Friends will have no individual contribution to the substantive merits of that determination.
In addition, the second requirement for associational
standing is met by Environmental Friends because the interests which the organization is attempting to protect via this
suit are most germane to the organization's purpose. Environmental Friends is a worldwide organization whose stated goals
are " 'respect for the environment and acknowledgment of
how little we understand its complexities.'" (R.5, quoting the
President of Environmental Friends). Moreover, 70% of the
7500 member responding to a 1989 questionnaire from the organization indicated that military toxics are "high" or "very
high" concerns. (R.5)
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Surely fostering respect for the environment and its complexities is germane to litigation asserting that those complexities be considered and respected by complying with NEPA to
adequately determine if and/or how the release of the genetically engineered microorganism will affect the environment of
the site and its surroundings. Indeed, the claim brought by
Environmental Friends is additionally of great moment to the
large majority of members who have an expressed interest in
the problems of military toxics. See Humane Soc.y of the
United States v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 53-59 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
This nexus not only meets, but exceeds the "mere pertinence"
required between the subject of the litigation and the organizations' purpose. Humane Soc'y, 840 F.2d at 58.
Lastly, there is the first prong of associational standing:
the members must have standing to sue in their own right.
Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343. Unlike the other two requirements,
this one cannot be addressed independently of the remainder
of the injury analysis. For Environmental Friends to have
standing to sue on behalf of its members, those members must
be threatened with injury and thereby have standing to sue in
their own right. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 901 F.2d 107, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
In other words, the question now becomes whether the members of Environmental Friends who supplied the affidavits in
support of this action have alleged specific facts supporting
injuries to their interests. The answer is a resounding yes!
These individuals have alleged specific injuries to their economic, recreational and aesthetic interests because of the
Army's failure to comply with NEPA.
2.

The economic, recreational, and aesthetic injuries
threatening the affiants meet the injury requirements of both the constitution and the APA and
are supported by the specific facts required to
withstand summary judgment.

To meet the injury requirements of the Constitution and
the APA, an injury need not have already occurred, it can be
threatened. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. Therefore, the fact
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that the Army has not actually applied the Biocore does not
defeat this claim. As one court has noted, "[t]he need to fully
assess potential harm before a project is undertaken is a major
justification for the broad test courts have laid down for
NEPA standing." City of Los Angeles v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). Environmental Friends can bring this challenge now, when the harm is threatened and imminent. An
individual is not required to sit patiently and watch impending doom approach without challenging the very cause of that
catastrophe before it occurs.
In addition, the injury suffered by the individual members must be "distinct and palpable." Worth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490, 501 (1975). In this regard, injury to an ideological
interest is not 'sufficient to establish standing, e.g., Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (general interest in conservation is not enough), nor is injury to an abstract interest,
e.g., Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 6667 (1986) (doctor's
abstract concern with medical practice standards insufficient).
However, the injuries alleged by the individual members of
Environmental Friends who supplied affidavits in this cause
are not abstract or merely ideological. They are the kinds of
"palpable and distinct" injuries which have been recognized
repeatedly as establishing a justiciable injury.
Affiants Dorothy and David Downs, Equalia Emelia and
Franco Francisco have alleged specific facts showing
threatened injury to their recreational and aesthetic interests.
All of these affiants use and enjoy the specific environs of the
missile site. The Downs regularly hike in the immediate area
of the site, often along the border fence itself. (R.4) Ms. Emelia lives only one-half mile from the site, (R.4), and her lifelong recreational use and aesthetic enjoyment of the environs
of her home are threatened. Mr. Francisco travels annually to
this unique and irreplaceable location for vacation. (R.4) See
Defenders of Wildlife v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1035, 1040 (8th Cir.
1988) (those who travel to areas where endangered species are
threatened have standing to challenge actions causing such
harm). Threats to these types of injuries have long been held
sufficient to establish injury. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton,
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405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972); Public Interest Research v. Powell
Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990).
In addition, all of these affiants have alleged specific injury to their economic interests, the interests traditionally
deemed to establish standing. See Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
733-34. The Downs are free-lance photographers who live a
part of each year within four miles of the missile site. (R.4)
Additionally, a portion of their income is dependent upon pictures taken in the immediate vicinity and adjacent small
towns. (R.4) This income would be severely decreased, if not
altogether eliminated, should the area become unfit for
humans or otherwise impaired by the release of Biocore. Similarly, Ms. Emelia could conceivably lose the use of her home
and her lifelong investment therein. And, "persons who own
property in, or merely reside near, an area threatened by environmental injury have an interest sufficient to support standing . . . ." Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d
1283, 1290 (8th Cir. 1990). Finally, Mr. Francisco's economic
interests are implicated because degradation of the site's environment would preclude his annual visits, necessitating he go
elsewhere at perhaps greater expense. See, e.g., Harris v. City
of Zion, 927 F.2d 1401, 1406 (7th Cir. 1991) (willingness to
incur "tangible, albeit small cost" will support standing);
Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir 1986) (an "identifiable trifle"
can support the constitutional minimum for standing).
Not only do the injuries these affiants face support standing to bring this suit in their own right, the affidavits also set
forth facts specific enough to withstand the DOD's motion for
summary judgment. In Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177 (1990), the United State Supreme Court
rejected standing for the plaintiff organization because its individual members did not aver specific facts to support injury.
The court stated therein that "Rule 56(e) is assuredly not satisfied by averments which state only that one of respondent's
members uses unspecified portions of an immense tract of territory, on some portion of which mining activity has occurred
or probably will occur by virtue of some government action."
Id. at 3189. The situation in the present case is diametrically
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opposed to that of the National Wildlife Federation in Lujan.
There is no immense tract of land in this case, just the
missile site and its immediate environs. While heavy rain or
flooding could spread Biocore over a vast area, Environmental
Friends does not predicate standing on that potential disaster.
The injuries threatening the affiants would occur within four
miles of the missile site itself, the area which would be most
directly affected should Biocore prove uncontainable to the
site itself. The affiants have alleged facts showing the specific
areas which they use. Injury-in fact is established by the serious environmental impacts which will be overlooked should
the Army fail to comply with NEPA. See City of Davis v.
Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir. 1975.) The instant case
deals with individuals who live, work, and play in the shadow
of a potential environmental disaster. Standing herein is not
based on "general allegations," but rather the specific facts required to successfully answer the DOD's motion for summary
judgment.
B.

Environmental Friends has established that the
threatened injuries it seeks to protect are fairly
traceable to the Department of Defense's failure to
comply with the procedures of NEPA, a failure evidenced by three specific final agency actions and
redressable by simple compliance with the statute.

The second element of constitutional standing requires
that the threatened injury to a plaintiff be "fairly traceable to
the challenged action." Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454
U.S. 464, 472 (1982). Moreover, when an action of a government agency is challenged under the APA, that action must
be a "final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). This requisite has
been interpreted to mean that the plaintiff must be able to
point to a particular, discrete agency action which causes the
injuries. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 110 S. Ct.
3177, 3187 (1990). Combined in a single "rule," the plaintiff
must show that a specific final agency action is the source of
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the threatened injury.
NEPA is a procedural statute designed to ensure that
agencies consider the environmental consequences of their actions and take steps to minimize environmental harm to the
extent possible. City of Los Angeles v. National Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 492 (D.C. Cir 1990); City
of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670-71, 670 n.12 (9th Cir.
1975). The Army intends to apply Biocore to the Venice, Italy, missile site Without complying with those procedures. The
Army thereby risks causing tremendous harm because Biocore's impact on a natural ecosystem is virtually unknown.
That harm is traceable to the Army's refusal to comply with
NEPA. If NEPA's procedures do not apply now, before the
organism is released, the opportunity to asses Biocore's potential effects before any damage is done will be lost. Compliance
with NEPA would ensure that the environmental effects of releasing Biocore at this particular site would be considered.
Environmental Friends can identify three particular final
agency actions which are the source of the injuries in this
case: (1) the failure of the Army to do an EIS, (2) the completion of the "Summary Environmental Analysis of the Venice,
Italy, Missile Site Clean-up" (R.3-4), and (3) the announcement by the Army that it will use Biocore on this site, coupled
with the affirmative activities initiated to complete that task.
(R.3-4) Any one of these actions is a specific final action subject to review under the APA. In addition, they are sufficient
to withstand a motion for summary judgement.
Agency action can be inaction or failure to act. Sierra
Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Thus, the
failure of the Army to comply with NEPA's procedural requirements is a final action. The effects of this inaction are
identical to those of an expressed denial to comply with the
statute. See Her Majesty, the Queen in Right of Ontario v.
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 912 F.2d 1525, 1531
(D.C. Cir. 1990). One court recently indicated that failure to
do an EIS could not be reviewed as final action when the organization claims injury only to its informational interests.
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 87
(D.C. Cir 1991). However, the holding therein was specifically
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limited to those particular facts. Id. This is not the situation
with respect to Environmental Friends, whose standing to
bring this action is predicated upon the threatened injury to
its individual member affiants' economic, recreational, and
aesthetic interests. The effect of the Army's failure to act here
is as loud and clear as if they had shouted, "We will not do
it!" That failure is reviewable as final agency action.
Alternatively, the "Summary Environmental Analysis of
the Venice, Italy, Missile Site Cleanup" ("Summary Analysis") prepared by the Army in March 1990 (R.3) is reviewable
as a specific final agency action. This document discusses only
the laboratory development and controlled greenhouse testing
of Biocore (R.3), but not its impact on the particular site. It
is, nevertheless, the Army's definitive statement on the environmental impacts of the project and, as such, is reviewable at
this time. See Her Majesty, 912 F.2d at 1531 (finality is determined by the definitiveness of the agency's position);. Friedman Bros. Inv. Co. v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 1217, 1319 (9th Cir.
1.982) (despite no final commitment of money for construction
of bus depot, the "agency has spoken its last word on the project's environmental impact").
The Summary Analysis is not a preliminary report; the
Army has no intention of engaging in any further environmental assessment. See Tennessee v. Herrington, 626 F. Supp.
1345, 1354 (M.D. Tenn. 1986) (recommendation to build facility is final, not preliminary, although further action would be
required to complete construction plans). Neither the Summary Analysis nor the environmental assessment and "finding
of no significant impact," completed on Biocore's laboratory
development (R.4), address use of the organism at this specific
site, considering its particular characteristics. (R.3-4) Since
the limited information in this report does not comport with
the requirements for adequate environmental analysis, see 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (1988), and constitutes the Army's final
word on the use of Biocore at the site, it is reviewable at this
time.
Finally, in September of 1990, the Army formally announced in congressional hearings that it does intend to use
Biocore at the Venice, Italy, site. (R.3-4) Furthermore, the
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project is included in the Army's fiscal planning for 1992, and
$500,000 has been set aside to fund the project. (R.5-6) The
individuals who will complete this task have been advised it
will commence in the summer of 1992. (R.6) Together these
activities indicate the Army's firm commitment to the project.
The Court is not being asked to resolve a dispute on some
hypothetical proposal. The Army fully intends to go through
with this activity with no further assessment. Review at this
time will not disrupt any agency decision-making process. See
American Dairy of Evansville, Inc. v. Bergland, 627 F.2d
1252, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (review is appropriate when it will
not disrupt agency processes and rights and obligations have
been determined by the action).
The fact that the Army does not consider its decision "final" until travel orders have been issued to the individuals
who will go to Italy (R.5-6) is immaterial. An agency's internal
characterization of its actions are not conclusive for determining finality. See Pennzoil Co. v. FederalEnergy Reg. Comm'n,
645 F.2d 394, 399 (5th.Cir. 1981) (agency characterization not
decisive, though it is evidence). Judicial review is appropriate
now, before an irrevocable step is taken. Furthermore, denial
of review at this time would work considerable hardship on
the plaintiffs since once those travel orders are issued and Biocore is applied, the damage will be done and the benefits of
adequate environmental assessment would be moot. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967).
It is clear that the injuries which threaten Environmental
Friends directly result from the Army's failure to comply with
the mandate of NEPA. In addition, compliance would adequately address those injuries. Environmental Friends requests that the environmental effects of this project be considered and not summarily overlooked. That is the mandate of
NEPA. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Compliance with
NEPA's procedures would obviously redress this injury and
provide an adequate basis for consideration of the environmental impacts of the Army's project.
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The injuries which Environmental Friends seeks to
prevent in this action are "within the meaning of
the statute" because they are the very interests
which NEPA was designed to protect.

The final requirement for judicial review of agency action
is that the injury suffered be "within the meaning of the relevant statute." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988). This has come to be
called the "zone of interests" test. Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 3187 (1990). To fulfill this requirement, Environmental Friends must show that the injuries fall within the " 'zone of interests' sought to be protected
by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis of [the] complaint." Id. at 3186. There is no doubt that
NEPA was specifically designed to protect the types of economic, recreational and aesthetic interests which have been
demonstrated by Environmental Friends and its affiants. E.g.,
id. at 3187 (finding that the affiants alleged recreational injuries, if properly established in the context of a summary judgment, would be within NEPA's "zone of interest"). This is the
whole point of its design to "eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of
man...." 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
II.

NEPA ADDRESSES THE PREVENTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION BY MANDATING
THAT FEDERAL AGENCIES CONSIDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF MAJOR FEDERAL ACTIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT IMPACTS, NOTWITHSTANDING
THEIR
EXTRATERRITORIAL
LOCATION.
A.

Congress Has The Inherent Authority To Apply The
ProceduralMandates Of NEPA Beyond the Boundaries of the United States.

The United States is not constrained by international law
when policing the conduct of United States citizens in foreign
countries as long as there is no infringement upon another nation's sovereignty, its citizens' rights, or the president's for-
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eign policy power. See generally Steele v. Bulova, 344 U.S.
280, 285-286 (1952); The Extraterritorial Scope of NEPA's
Environmental Impact Statement Requirement, 74 Mich. L.
Rev. 349 (1975). The government's authority to regulate compliance with extraterritorial implications is further strengthened and encouraged if such activity will have domestic effects or will threaten national security or government
functions. See generally Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. §§ 402(1)(c) (1987).
Consistent with the foregoing principles, NEPA does not
regulate individual conduct of "civilian" residents, nor the activities or rights of other nations, but rather it regulates only
the activities of the United States federal government. See 42
U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). The
requirements are designed to ensure that agencies are informed about the environmental ramifications of their activities. All decisions affecting the use of Biocore will be made by
federal agency officials within the territorial boundaries of the
United States. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law of the U.S. §§ 402(1)(c) (1987). The DOD has already
decided to apply Biocore to facilitate cleanup of the missile
site. (R.3-4) Environmental Friends is advocating that NEPA
applies simply to ensure that the appellant makes an enlightened decision based on an adequate environmental
assessment.
B.

NEPA Demonstrates Congressional Intent for the
Mandatory Procedures of the Act To Apply
Extraterritorially.

Congressional intent to apply an act extraterritorially
may be demonstrated in two ways: (1) Congress may speak
directly on the issue using explicit language, or (2) an examination of the Act's structure and legislative history may reveal
Congress's inherent purpose. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 Fed.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1990); Chevron USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Clear
and unambiguous intent does not depend on "[w]hether a
particular phrase in the statutory text standing alone resolves
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the matter." K-Mart Corporation v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281 (1988). But rather, courts are required to examine "the
language, and design of the statute as a whole." Id.; Davis v.
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1504 (1989).
NEPA's "Congressional Declaration of Purpose" specifically enumerates the general thrust of the Act and clearly asserts that it is "[t]o declare a national policy which will ...
promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the
environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man." 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988) (emphasis added). "Biosphere" is defined as "[tihe part of the earth, its waters, and
atmosphere where organisms can live." Webster's II New Riverside Dictionary 73 (1984). Therefore, the purpose is to "prevent or eliminate damage" to the part of the earth inhabited
by organisms, not just the part of the earth labeled the United
States. Additionally, the term "man" connotes an intent to
protect the health and welfare of all peoples, regardless of
their citizenry. The word "man" has been used for centuries
to indicate all of humanity.
Furthermore, the "Declaration of National Environmental Policy," which is codified in section 101 of NEPA, conveys
Congress' purpose and the policy of the federal government:
The Congress recognizing the profound impact of man's
activities on interrelations of all components of the natural environment ... declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government .... to use all practicable
means.., to create and maintain conditions under which
man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans.
42 U.S.C. § 4321(a) (1988) (emphasis added). This all inclusive and expansive language indicates that Congress intended
for NEPA to be applied to prevent environmental degradation
worldwide.
Congress decided to take an active role in promoting
worldwide environmental preservation and preventing environmental degradation. Through NEPA, it established a comprehensive regulatory scheme to ensure cooperation with for-
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eign countries, facilitate environmental awareness, and govern
all major federal actions affecting the "human environment."
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1988). Although the phrase "human
environment," as used in section 102(2)(C), indicates the humanly subjective focus Congress intended environmental preservation to receive, it certainly places no geographical boundary upon the extension of the Act. Id. See Hearings on S.
1075, and S. 10752 before the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular. Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 118 (1969). The provisions of section 102(2) indicate that the Act was designed so
that all the sections supplement and enhance one another.
Their structure and flavor verify the inference that Congress
intends all agencies of the federal government to consider the
international scope of environmental problems.
Further evidence of Congress' intent is readily found elsewhere in the statute. For example, section 102(2)(F) plainly
states that all federal agencies "shall ... recognize the worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems
and, lend support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs
designed to maximize internationalcooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in the quality of mankind's world
environment . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988) (emphasis
added). These phrases, like the policy statement, are clear and
unambiguous in their directive. Use of the word "shall" in
statutory language is considered mandatory. Anderson v.
Yung Kau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947). No qualifications are
placed upon the Act which exempt certain agencies based
upon their departmental branch or locus operandi. Congress
fully intended for federal agencies to disregard their physical
location and focus on worldwide environmental preservation.
Clearly, although Congress did not specifically enumerate
its concern for worldwide environmental degradation in each
provision, there is no doubt that Congress intended it to receive attention. Congress predicated the mandate of section
102 with "all agencies of the Federal Government shall .. .
42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1977) (emphasis added), indicating that all
the provisions are supplementary and not mutually exclusive.
This includes section 102(2)(F) which requires environmental
attention on a worldwide sphere. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F)
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(1988).
In fact, Congress uses few words in NEPA which could
indicate that a geographical limitation is to be placed upon
the act. Such words as "Americans" and "nation" provide a
slender reed upon which to base the argument that NEPA is
not to be applied extraterritorially. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)
(1988). The use of these few restrictive words are not persuasive enough to refute the basic flavor, structure and message
of the Act when considered in its entirety. See K-Mart Corporation,486 U.S. 281 (1988). Although the Act does detail some
goals which obviously would only be pertinent to preserving
resources within the United States. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §
4331(b)(4) (1988) (mandatory preservation of historical and
cultural aspects of our national heritage), these directives do
not abrogate the overall scheme of the Act, but rather detail
some of the specific concerns which Congress intended to be
addressed.
In no part of the Act is NEPA's application specifically
limited. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). To infer that because the
Act is the United States' "national" policy it cannot be used
to address the impacts of our actions on other countries abrogates the structure 6f the entire Act. See generally Pincas,
The "NEPA-Abroad" Controversy: Unresolved by an Executive Order, 30 Buff. L. Rev. 611, 621 n.51 (1981). Such concerns provided the impetus for promulgating a law to prevent
environmental degradation and "create and maintain" conditions conducive to man and nature's harmonic coexistence.
C.

The legislative history of NEPA, both before and after the Act's passage, indicates it is intended to
have an extraterritorialextension.

In the 1960s Congress entertained various approaches to
ensure a comprehensive environmental policy-but none
proved adequate to overcome all hurdles. Then, in 1968, a
House Committee and a Senate Committee decided to come
together to promulgate a working environmental management
and policy structure. The House Committee on Science and
Astronautics and the Senate Committee on Interior and Insu-
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lar Affairs convened, and in what is termed the Joint Colloquium was born. See House Comm. on Science and Astronautics and Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th
Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional White Paper on a National
Policy for the Environment 15 (Comm. Print 1968).
Each committee issued a report before convening at the
colloquium. The Senate report stated:
The United States, as the greatest user of natural resources and manipulator of nature in all history, has a
large and obvious stake in the protection and wise management of man-environment relationships everywhere...
. Effective international environmental control would ...
be in the interest of the United States, and could hardly
be prejudicial to the legitimate interest of any nation.
Special Report to the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 13, A National Policy for the
Environment (1968). By the same token, the House Committee's report stated: "[e]nvironmental management will often
transcend national borders." Subcomm. on Science, Research,
and Development of House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, Managing the Environment, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 16
(Comm. Print 1968). The latter also specifically endorsed a
national policy that would consider "worldwide effects" and
facilitate international cooperation. Id. at 7.
The Joint Colloquium then issued a congressional White
Paper, summarizing the outcome of the proceedings and suggesting the statement of national policy on the environment
should be as follows: "It is the policy of the United States
that: environmental quality and productivity should be considered in a worldwide context, extending in time from the
present to the long term future." House Comm. on Science
and Astronautics and Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional White Paper on a
National Policy for the Environment (Comm. 1968) at 15. The
Joint Colloquium and its Congressional White Paper led directly to the promulgation of NEPA.
Just like legislative history preceding the Act's passage,
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the subsequent legislative history demonstrates that NEPA is
to apply to actions outside of the boundaries of this country.
See Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cir.
1990) (legislative history subsequent to passage is examined in
determining congressional intent to apply Endangered Species
Act extraterritorially). In House Oversight Hearings shortly
after the passage of NEPA, Congress demonstrated its intention to exact compliance with NEPA in both the domestic and
the foreign arenas. See generally Administration of the National Environmental Policy Act Hearing before the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. House of Representatives Report No. 92-316, Part 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 1971
("Oversight Hearings"). Among other things, the Oversight
Hearings considered a theory proposed by the State Department that environmental impacts within a foreign boundary
are not subject to the Act. In support the Department offered
a legal memorandum which proposed that legislation of the
United States generally does not apply within the jurisdiction
of a foreign state. Id. Congress responded with an outright rejection of this assumption, declaring that "[tihe history of the
Act makes it quite clear that the global affects of all environmental decisions ... must be considered." Oversight Hearings
Part 1, at 33. In sum, federal agencies are to apply the NEPA
mandates to every major federal action significantly affecting
the environment, including those which effect areas entirely
outside the United States.
Congressional intent is further evidenced in Senate Resolution 49, a policy for encouraging international treaties in
which member states are required to prepare an EIS addressing internal and external effects, including those which affect
only the territory of another nation. S. Res. 49, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1978). This resolution demonstrates that Congress intends for the EIS to be required in actions involving impacts
solely within a foreign jurisdiction. The Senate would hardly
propose that the United States seek treaties requiring other
nations to consider environmental impacts if it did not expect
its own government to do so.
Congress additionally demonstrates its understanding
that NEPA applies to actions outside the boundaries of the
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United States in the Base Closure Act. Base Closure Act 100
Pub. Law 526, 102 Statutes 2623 (1988). This statute recognizes that United States military installations abroad are subject to NEPA, by modifying the environmental duties thereunder to a limited degree. Id. Congress would not have
suspended the Department's duties if it did not recognize that
NEPA applies in the first instance. While the statute recognizes that domestic base closures and foreign closures will
have different evaluation requirements in terms of the socioeconomic effects, there is no such distinction made as regards
the environmental analysis.
Finally, Congress recently demonstrated again that
NEPA is to apply to extraterritorial actions. Major consolidation of the various environmental agencies, proposed just last
year, includes a clarification that NEPA requires an environmental statement to be prepared whether the impact occurs
within the boundaries of the United States or not. House of
Representatives 3475 § 505, 102nd Cong., 1st sess. (1990). In
the same spirit as the framers of NEPA, the proponents of
this Act recognize that the environmental mandate applies to
extraterritorial action of the federal government as long as it
is consistent with other goals of this nation. Id.
Compliance with NEPA for the Biocore cleanup project
at the Venice missile site in no way conflicts with any other
goals of the DOD. In fact, since this action may well be the
prototype for cleanup at other military sites in Europe and
around the world, the goals of the DOD would be decidedly
furthered by assuring all nations involved that the United
States is sincere about its own commitment to environmental
protection. Congress intended for extraterritorial actions to be
governed by NEPA in 1969 and this purpose is even more evident in light of subsequent congressional history.
D. Executive Agencies and Executive Order 12114 Recognize That When Consistent With Other Important National Goals, NEPA Applies to Federal
Actions.
Executive agencies have provided statements that reflect
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their understanding that NEPA applies to foreign impacts.
Most persuasive are the Council on Environmental Qualities'
regulations which declare that NEPA applies to actions
outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. 40
C.F.R. 1500 (1988). The Council is the primary agency designated to interpret and evaluate the legislation. 42 U.S.C. §§
4341-347 (1988). The Council, following Congress' purpose,
explained NEPA's extraterritorial applications abroad, stating
that the "human environment... is not limited to the United
States but includes other countries . .. The Act contains no
express or implied geographic limitations of environmental
impact in the United States or any other area." Council on
Environmental Quality Memorandum of the Application of
the EIS Requirement to Environmental Impacts Abroad of
Major Federal Actions, September 24, 1974, reprinted in 42
Fed. Reg. 61068 (1977). While some agencies promulgated regulations evaluating NEPA's concerns abroad in accordance
with the Council on Environmental Quality guidelines, others
did not or at least not completely. See generally Mich. L. Rev.
349, 350 n.74 1975 (outlining selected agencies positions and
subsequent actions). The State Department recanted from its
original rejection of NEPA obligations when it established internal regulations. 37 Fed. Reg. 19167-68 (1972). However, the
Department of Defense continues to resist the full demands of
NEPA and was a major player in the compromise resolution
provided by Executive Order 12114 ("Order"), a Presidential
directive to limit consideration of environmental factors.
Exec. Order No. 12114, 3 C.F.R. 356 (1980).
The executive order purports to be issued by the independent authority of the President, although the source of
that authority remains unclear. See id. at 1-1. The Order
claims to further the policy of NEPA, as well as other environmental legislation, but is deeply concerned with the foreign relations and security posture of this nation, a strong indication that those functions provided a source for the Order.
See id. at 1-1 and 2-5 (enumerating the President's integral
diplomatic and defense prerogatives as completely exempt). It
is clear that the White House saw the preeminent function of
Executive Order 12114 as defining the interests in foreign af-
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fairs and national security that must be pursued in conjunction with the pursuit of environmental interests. Thus, the
Order is the sole interpretation of the United States environmental obligations with respect to government activities
abroad, when those activities are primarily related to diplomatic or security objectives of the nation. The objective here
is environmental consideration, and there are neither overriding diplomatic nor security considerations in cleanup of an obsolete military site.
E.

After considering the language and purpose of
NEPA, its legislative history and its interpretation
by other branches and agencies, courts which have
considered NEPA's extraterritorialextension have
concluded that the Act may properly apply outside
of the United States.

NEPA has been held to apply to major actions of federal
agencies which have significant impacts on a foreign nation, if
those actions also result in environmental impacts in the
United States. Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 38 (D.C. Cir.
1978). The court found that the Federal Highway Administration's funding of the Pan American Highway in Panama and
Columbia would engender impacts in those nations which
could in turn increase the likelihood of disease in domestic
cattle. Id. Likewise, in Italy, the army endangers the health of
its own soldiers by using an unreliable cleanup method. This
danger reaches to those who will apply the Biocore to the site
as well as those responsible for maintenance in the future.
These United States soldiers obviously deserve the same consideration as domestic cattle.
In another case the court considered NEPA in the context of the United States' participation in herbicide spraying
entirely within the borders of Mexico. See National Organization for Reform of MarijuanaLaws v. United States, 452 F.
Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1978). The court therein found the United
States' participation to fall within the meaning of section
102(2)(C) of NEPA, even though the program took place
solely within the territory of another nation. Id. Because the
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government agreed to prepare an EIS for any effects which
could reach the United States, the court did not have to actually decide whether an EIS was required for extraterritorial
effects. Id. Nonetheless, in approval of the settlement which
had been reached, the court was willing to assume that NEPA
did apply to an action solely within Mexico. Id. This decision
illustrates that NEPA does apply outside the United States
especially where the dangers primarily confronting foreign jurisdictions could also be detrimental to American citizens.
Under this analysis, the Army's plan to use an unproven microorganism is subject to NEPA because, while primarily affecting Italy, the use also threatens United States personnel
on the site as well as Environmental Friends members.
The problem of conflicting congressional goals arose in a
case which considered whether to apply NEPA to an action
involving a proposed nuclear reactor license in the Philippines. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The court
weighed the environmental demands of NEPA against the
nonproliferation goals of the Atomic Energy Act and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. See id. at 1357. The court performed a balancing test between the Commission's claim that
the license was a part of the "common defense in security"
and the environmental mandates embodied in NEPA. See id.
Both the plurality and concurring opinions recognized that
NEPA's directives apply to the Commission's actions whether
or not an EIS was required. See id. at 1387 (concurring opinion of Robinson, judge) ("NRC should remain cognizant of
-this responsibility," and footnote 163 referring to support in
plurality opinion). However, because Congress has provided
explicit directives in the Atomic Energy Act and Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act, the court found that the environmental
effects of licensing must not prevent the issuance of that license. Id. at 1366. The court recognized that section 102(2)(F)
of NEPA provides that consistency with foreign policy is an
appropriation.' See id. There are no opposing congressional
purposes or any detrimental foreign policy considerations
which are inimical to applying NEPA's procedures at the
Venice, Italy, missile site.
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Finally, the District Court of Hawaii has also recognized
that NEPA's procedural requirements and other foreign policy goals must be weighed in a balancing test to determine
whether to require an EIS extraterritorially. Greenpeace USA
v. Stone, 748 F. Supp. 749, 754 (D. Ct. Haw. 1990). This balancing test is not a contravention of NEPA but rather one of
the alternatives provided within the statute itself. Id. at 760;
see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988). NEPA should apply to all
actions, including those entirely outside of the United States,
when the statute's mandate is consistent with other goals.
Since foreign, policy or security goals are not obstructed, the
Army should be compelled to act in accordance with law.
NEPA applies to extraterritorial action where it is not in conflict with other policies. Because the Venice site presents no
opposing considerations of this type NEPA applies.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Environmental Friends, Inc.
requests that the decision of the District Court for the Eastern Section of Virginia be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Attorneys for Appellee
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